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The spectacular showing : Houdini and the wonder of 
ethnomethodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.” Wittgenstein. TLP. 
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elaurier@geog.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 2 
Intro: 
This essay is about Houdini’s escapes and ethnomethodology’s studies. By 
accomplishing what appears to be impossible, Houdini leaves his audience 
considering not only: how did he manage to do that, but also: just what is it that 
we consider to be possible. For magicians and escapologists, we are 
uninterested in the mechanics of their tricks whilst thrilled by what they 
dramatically present to us : a sense of the limits to what we can apprehend as an 
audience. While marking out the differences in their projects the essay brings 
out the shared urge of escapologists and ethnomethodologist to show where 
others tell and to awaken us to the wonder of the world. In reflecting on what 
happens when magicians reveal the devices that constitute their tricks, I ask 
whether the purpose of studying phenomena can only reside in revealing how 
they are produced as intelligible acts. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
 
For a couple of hours the bustle of Boston city centre has 
come to a standstill. A tall square office building forms 
the impassive, concrete and certain death backdrop to the 
fragile figure. Along the streets erratically parked cars, 
fire engines, crowds of any old un-ticketed people of the 
city collectively craning their necks and newspaper 
photographers clicking their shutters. So small and yet 
you can see him swinging slightly on his rope as he 
twists inside his straitjacket: Houdini. 
 
Let’s switch scenes: think about Houdini somewhere else 
than suspended from an edifice, leaping manacled off a 
bridge or escaping from a high security prison: 
 
On one occasion,  I took him to a magicians’ meeting in my car, which that season was 
a Ford Model T coupe with a front seat of only two-person width and with the door 
catches inconveniently placed behind a person’s elbow. When he tried to twist around 
and work the catch, Houdini found it stuck and in all seriousness, he demanded, “Say – 
how do you get out of this thing?” It wasn’t until I had reached across and pulled the 
knob for him that he began laughing, because he of all people couldn’t get out of a 
Ford coupe. (pxiv Gibson 1953) 
 
It was not that Houdini was any different in his hands-on experience of a modern 
world daily provided with new mass-produced boxes to get stuck in. He was different 
in the shocks he administered to that world’s expectations of boxes, locks, barrels, 
ropes and bags. As he toured the world he was challenged to get out of all kinds of 
otherwise sinister constraints: straitjackets for the mad in the USA, prisons in 
countries all over the world and deportation railway carriages to Siberia in the newly 
founded USSR: 
 
 3 
“I think my escape from the Siberian Transport was my most difficult performance. I 
was placed in the great vault usually assigned to political prisoners, and when the great 
door was shut, I had the hardest time of my life, perhaps, in releasing myself. But 
nevertheless it took me eighteen minutes to walk out, and face the dazed officials” 
Houdini quoted in an interview with the Appleton Crescent Newspaper (Feber 1904) 
 
Watched over in cuffs by police officers, in 
straitjackets by psychiatrists, dangling from 
ropes by fire fighters, in submerged boxes by 
sailors and in cells by gaolers, he entertained 
the masses by getting them, in a life or death 
gamble upon his extraordinary skills, to 
question ‘will Houdini do it? How could he 
possibly do it?’ And after each attempt to 
restrain him fails, the crowd thrills and the 
officials daze. The exceptional license 
Houdini is being given is to show, with 
professional witnesses and the populace 
present, how ineffective their technologies of 
restraint and confinement are. As Adam 
Philips adds: 
 
What Houdini shows, but doesn’t tell, is that 
legitimating oneself, making one’s name, is itself 
a curious game. If a criminal escapes from prison 
he is punished; if Houdini escapes from prison he 
is fulsomely rewarded. And in celebrating 
Houdini’s skill the audience is applauding a talent 
that is potentially a threat to society p42 (Phillips 2001) 
 
Is society so fragile, so easily threatened by an escape artist? Did prisoners learn from 
Houdini’s techniques and escape en masse? Did Houdini ever steal wallets from his 
audience, and not give them back afterwards? For all of his exposure of the 
defeasibility of material restraints, Houdini was no social reformer nor direct critic of 
social constraints or conventions, in fact his critical energies were devoted to 
exposing the seemingly harmless targets of mediums and the Spiritualist movement. 
Yet even if he did not directly attack Russian deportation or US penal policy we 
should still consider Houdini’s talent for bringing technologies of constraint and 
restraint into the public gaze surreptitiously. And once there, of altering his 
audience’s way of looking at institutional scenes. As Phillips notes of his struggle to 
escape from a madman’s shackles, Houdini closely resembles a madman: sweating, 
eyes bulging and his limbs thrashing as if he were having a fit. To the audience he 
makes it very clear that attempting to escape from a lunatic’s shackles produces the 
appearance of madness. The desire to escape is understandable and in Houdini’s case 
accepted as expected (what would it be if Houdini lay docile?) When he finally 
escapes, his clothes are sweat-stained and in tatters. Free from constraint he returns to 
normal, but what if he were bound up again. And again. Well he is of course, but he is 
‘Houdini’ and he has been given the right to be confined and escape regularly, with 
reasonable rest breaks in between and a not insubstantial fee for his performance. 
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2. 
 
A student goes home after attending a university class where she has been told to go 
and do an ‘experiment’ which will form the basis of the next lesson. Her instructions 
are simple: she is to go into a café during a quiet period, buy her coffee, look around 
and then select a table with someone else or a group already sitting at it with whom 
she is unacquainted. Without saying anything she should pull out a chair and sit at the 
table. She should not say why she is sitting at the table, though she can engage in 
conversation on whatever other topic. Whether she is engaged in conversation or not 
she should drink her coffee in a relaxed and friendly manner, as if they were old 
acquaintances. She must not give up her seat at the table. Only when she is leaving 
should she explain that is doing an exercise for a university course on social 
interaction in public places.  
 
When the class finally get back together she relates her story of sitting down at a table 
with an old woman, who looked fairly harmless. Having sat at the table and put her 
coffee cup down, the elderly lady eyed her with suspicion and sat silent for a minute 
or two. The girl feeling a little anxious smiled but kept quiet. ‘Are you going to ask 
me to come to a church service?’ the lady finally asked. The class laugh loudly and 
sympathetically - they have various stories to tell about how their inappropriate 
behaviour was dealt with by café customers. Many were greeted with suspicion, some 
with irritation and a surprising few were greeted with pleasure. People at the tables 
had asked what they were up to, or made assumption that they were about to be 
chatted up, or sold something or asked to church. Her question, as posed by her 
studies is: ‘how does anyone do what everyone clearly does without any great 
difficulty?’ 
 
This kind of ‘ breaching experiment’ will no doubt be familiar to those who have any 
knowledge of Garfinkel’s (1963; 1964; 1967) early investigations on trust and the 
routine grounds of everyday activities.  The breaching experiments serve several 
purposes for ethnomethodologists: they test out the Parsonian theory of rationality and 
mutual understanding (Parsons 1951; Parsons 1968), they make ‘seen but un-noticed’ 
features of everyday life visible, they show that social order is not as fragile as many 
social theories might claim it to be, and they initiate students into the study of 
societies’ methodical procedures for the production of order, or, ethnomethods 
(Livingston 1987). When students of ethnomethodology deliberately try to get an 
encounter in public to fail by behaving inappropriately (e.g. selecting a café table that 
is already [taken] when others are [free]1) they barely make a dent in social order, let 
alone cause it to collapse. Yet: 
 
‘In the face of the attempted breaches of trust and expectations, what Durkheim 
identified as the moral order of daily life exerts such a powerful presence that 
considerable lengths will be gone to in order to retain, if at all possible, the 
things-as-usual character of ordinary life’ p32 (Sharrock and Anderson 1986).  
 
What sense does it make to consider Houdini’s magic tricks, impossible feats and 
great escapes beside ethnomethodology’s study of everyday competences, ubiquitous 
                                                 
1 Square brackets are used by phenomenologists and Garfinkel as a rendering device for the field 
properties of a phenomenon. 
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devices and rule use? There is the danger of ‘perspective by incongruity’ (Watson 
2000) where we may lose the essence of magic by equating it erroneously with 
ethnomethodological study.  
 
Houdini’s daring doing may be too 
mesmerising for a tradition in 
ethnomethodology2 which has devoted a 
great deal of attention to ‘doing being 
ordinary’, to conventionality as an 
accomplishment (Sacks 1984; Schegloff 
1986). For those of us committed to 
studying ordinary action it is a struggle to 
set aside his grandiose gestures, 
proclamations and exclamations in 
favour of the routine aspects of what 
constitutes a performance of ‘Houdini!’3. 
Let us try for a while to suspend what an 
audience makes of an amazing escape. 
Consider instead that for Houdini these 
spectacular stunts and ordeals had to 
become thoroughly routine. His picking 
of locks while submerged underwater had 
to become through daily practice as 
effortless as an ordinary member 
unlocking their front door on a rainy day. As a vernacular expert in producing 
spectacle Houdini was aware of and reliant on its uses : 
 
Spectacular escapes 
Strange as it may appear, I have found that the more spectacular the fastening to the 
eyes of the audience, the less difficult the escape really proves to be. pp45-46 
 
There is something about the spectacular fastening that fixates an audience and makes 
it easy for the artist to do his difficult hidden work without it being noticed, magicians 
call it ‘misdirecting’. Houdini himself is agreeing here that what is spectacular may 
not be what is difficult, it may be the easiest thing to convince an audience with. 
Taking an ethnomethodological perspective and considering the production side to 
directing attention, it is the kind of fastener which holds the audience’s attention on it 
when, if they wished to expose Houdini, they should be looking elsewhere. David 
Blaine (2002) compares this to the way a chess master uses certain bold moves to 
attract their opponents attention while they are actually up to something else 
elsewhere on the board4. For the audience the fastening is where we expect to see the 
‘escape’ happen, it is by misdirecting our attention on this that the technologies of the 
trick go un-noticed. 
 
                                                 
2 F A Mesmer’s experiments in animal magnetism were the source for this word, indicating a hypnotic 
state of fascination. 
3 Lynch and Bogen (1996) have carried out an exemplary study of situating the spectacle in the 
courtroom during the Iran-Contra trial and its relation to the historical record, truth-finding and more.  
4 Rod Watson (ref.) makes a similar point on the operation of a gang of pickpockets in Nice . 
 6 
Ethnomethodology urges that its practitioners should notice what is unseen because it 
is so obvious. A note of caution here, Houdini deliberately hides what he is really up 
to, and the danger is that when we notice something ‘hidden’ in everyday life it 
entails an intentional agent, similar to a Houdini,  that hides things by pulling the 
wool over our eyes5. This is where ethnomethodology, in alerting us to un-noticed 
orderly features of social action, to our ‘trust in appearances’, might be misunderstood 
as revealing member’s ignorance of a massive con trick, whereas its concerns are that 
the massively orderly nature of our lives goes un-noticed and how it is that 
trustworthy appearances are routinely recognised and produced. Ethnomethdology 
proposes that we might be amazed by what we are doing in our everyday lives, rather 
than suspicious that if it is so organized then surely a spirit of the age, a form of 
capitalism, a genetic blueprint or a shared neural pattern must have done the 
organizing. That participants in a conversation can take turns at talking and so rapidly, 
economically, intelligibly is awe-inspiring for Sacks (1992). That players of tic-tac-
toe cannot be stopped in their reasoning despite the greatest possible noncompliance 
with the game by their opponent amazes Garfinkel (ref).  
 
Part of our natural attitude to the world is that we trust in its appearances and it is so 
ordinary, so humble, and so utterly obvious that we fail to see it (Schutz 1973). There 
are occasions when we reflect on what happens, for instance, when we trip up and the 
smooth flow of our conduct is interrupted, when we visit a foreign country, when we 
follow the joke made by Seinfeld6 doing ‘observational comedy, or, when we take up 
professional studies of human matters (of theorising, business, science, design, law, 
medicine). Are our everyday occasioned reflection on our practices, and 
ethnomethodology’s more rigorous investigations, so far from Houdini’s request for 
an audience to look closely at him and his spectacular bonds, his cells, his cuffs or his 
straitjackets? Already we may be able to guess that there are some reversals at work 
here that may reveal further shared principles. From Garfinkel (1967) and 
Wittgenstein (1953) we have the constant reminder : everything is in plain sight. The 
skill of the philosopher or ethnomethodologists is in revealing what is right before our 
eyes but we cannot see because we are blinded by its obviousness. From Houdini: we 
cannot see how he actually does what he does because we are blinded by the spectacle 
he has assembled as part of what he does. Ethnomethodology is not saying that 
ordinary members are magicians, since the magician knows how, in detail, their trick 
works, they can show us how it works and what it constitutes. The ordinary member 
is more or less uninterested in how they produce order, it is ethnomethodology that 
shows the methods that produce order. Houdini’s many escapades offered a lesson not 
all that far from ethnomethodology’s raison d’etre, as Gibson writes in his 
introduction to his collection of Houdini’s works: 
 
In all, this book, with its abundance of Houdini’s own writings, shows how clearly 
magic, as practised by Houdini, was and is explainable by one faculty only: that of 
human accomplishment, pxv (Gibson 1953). 
 
 
                                                 
5 Incidentally pulling hats down over the eyes of pedestrians during a robbery is a trick mention by 
Houdini (1953) in ‘The Right Way to Do Wrong’. 
6 A hugely popular US TV comedy show from the late 90s based on the principle of its characters 
doing nothing and obsessing on nothing much, or perhaps more accurately dwelling at great length on 
the obvious. 
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3. 
 
Off duty, during his ‘free time’ Houdini lived life as usual like anyone else, struggling 
to find the lever or knob that opens the car door. He could not always live as the 
exceptional human he was during his challenges and magic tricks. Except of course 
for the witness to Houdini being unable to get out of a perfectly ordinary car, such an 
event becomes a storyable thing. While there is continuity there is clearly 
discontinuity too, it is not Houdini, when this person is off duty. If the car were to 
become part of [performing Houdini] he would have spent time in advance inspecting 
its interior, planning his escape, assessing what witnesses could and couldn’t see 
through its windows and so on. To do performing Houdini requires careful planning, 
some fiddling with the setting and often some tiny hidden tools.  Ethnomethodologists 
despite their acute attention to practical competence are during their ‘free time’ as 
incompetent as anyone else. This is sort of laughable and sort of intriguing at the 
same time. Like Wittgenstein’s approach to language, ethnomethodology does not 
seek greater mastery of practice nor to correct practice. Its promises of leaving 
everything as it found it are refreshing compared to the reductive explanations, a 
priori politics or moral superiority of much critical theory.  Yet isn’t the expectation 
that we have of Houdini that his talents, his considerable reflection upon and skill 
with doors, locks and boxes might help him in his ordinary life? Can 
ethnomethodology help its practitioners live their lives, can it help members become 
anything else? 
 
Phillips (2001) makes a distinction between Houdini’s performances : the open 
struggle / the hidden escape. Neither of which seem possible on observing them as an 
ordinary member of the audience. 
 
A. The escapes from strait jackets 
dangling from skyscrapers and their 
like: Look it can be done! It is 
practical, it is part of our everyday 
world, it is, however … extra-
ordinary. Only training like Houdini’s 
will allow you to do as he has done. 
Only the exceptional, spectacular skill 
of Houdini could do this. This is not in 
any way what we expect ordinary 
people to be able to do or to endure.  
Nor would they want to do or endure 
it. 
 
B. The Chinese Water Torture Cell, 
Walking Through a Brick Wall and 
their like: An amazement akin to the great struggles to escape which show Houdini’s 
training, agility, athleticism and bravery at work. This time though with a focus on 
the equipment involved. How does this ‘black box’ work? Does it work like it appears 
to work. 
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In practice for Houdini pulling off the two kinds of escapes, the techniques are shared 
and for the audience we are not ignorant of the device being a conjuror’s ‘black box’. 
Its [secret] mechanism can remain a secret mechanism. We are perplexed when the 
device makes a play of being open to inspection: the use of glass in the Chinese Water 
Torture Cell plays upon this awareness that there is still something we cannot see 
even when the ‘black box’ is apparently transparent. In one of his later tricks, Houdini 
walks through a brick wall on stage, and it really is a solid cemented brick wall which 
members of the audience can bang with their hands and kick with their feet. In his 
guide to his tricks, Houdini revealed it was done through the use of a pliable carpet 
which obscured a trapdoor (Houdini 1953). As the curtain closed around Houdini the 
trapdoor was opened, Houdini would stretch the carpet and squeeze through the small 
gap created underneath the wall. 
 
What would ruin the show and make us ask for our money back is if Houdini fluffed 
using the machinery and we caught him wriggling in the gap under the wall. But wait, 
good magic is still more skilful than that since Houdini and other magicians will also 
use identifiable fluffs to make us think we have seen a mistake which turns out once 
again to be a distraction from the real trick. Or having been discovered they use one 
trick as the diversion from another one that they can initiate at that point. Discovery 
of how one trick is done does not preclude a good magic trick so long as there is 
another to follow that remains unexplained. Whenever Houdini’s tricks were 
duplicated by someone else he would expose how the trick worked and then do 
another escape which could no longer use the same trick to make it work. At Glasgow 
Zoo he attracted crowds to watch one of his nailed coffin escapes and then read in the 
newspaper that another magician was doing the same trick. Houdini did a public 
demonstration of how the coffin trick worked, spoiling his competitor’s performance 
and then proceeded to escape from a coffin now secured in a way that made the 
previous method of escape impossible. Houdini had to be impossible to imprison and 
equally impossible to work out how he did his current escapes. His show was ruined 
when anyone could know how the escape was done. To think about 
ethnomethodology for a moment, by catching members in the act, by catching mind-
in-action, is the show ruined?  
 
Houdini’s most likely successor is David Blaine, a New York street magician who is 
currently redoing many of Houdini’s most notorious feats including being buried in a 
coffin for a week. Blaine’s live burial was a mixture of endurance and a magic ‘black 
box’ that Houdini had been working on when he died7. The trouble for the audience 
watching Blaine’s feats of endurance is that they remain rightly suspicious that there 
is also trickery involved and that Blaine is not enduring what he claims to be. 
Endurance without the black boxes would not be magic though and moreover might 
be boring and ultimately trivialising (think of the Japanese game show ‘Endurance’ 
and how foolish its participants appeared).  
 
In Blaine’s most renowned performance so far he sealed himself in a block of ice for 
three days in the centre of a busy New York street, an endurance challenge that was a 
variant on an escape that Houdini patented but never worked out how to do 
                                                 
7 The customised coffin that had been on display during Houdini’s final tour was rather macabrely used 
for burying him dead. 
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(Silverman 1996)8. The audience were left asking, could he survive that long or is it a 
trick? Blaine, like Houdini, is a voracious reader, an expert in not just the 
technicalities of magic tricks and escape artistry but also in the history of the art 
(Blaine 2002). In a recent interview (Colin 2002) when a journalist pushed him for a 
‘how to do a Blaine trick’ : 
 
… although his new book is filled with the details, he gets tetchy when you ask 
him how he did a particular trick. 
 “That’s not why I do magic,” he says. “If you’re thinking that then you’re not 
getting what I do. If you watch a great actor in a great movie then you enjoy the 
moment, you’re not thinking about whom they’re dating. Some people that 
overcomplicate their lives think that way” (p3) 
 
Blaine’s instruction to anyone who wishes to get the point of what he does is to look 
at what he does as it happens, in ‘the moment’. His warning is that to try and think 
about the mechanisms, the devices and the training he must do, is to miss the 
phenomenon. You are not seeing ‘magic’ happen before your eyes, you are not seeing 
the whole because you are too busy searching for its parts. It is a curious demand 
since do we not naturally ask of spectacular phenomena like formation flying or 
skyscraper construction or  making a million on the stockmarket – how do they do 
that? If Blaine is warning that we may lose the amazement that he has brought if we 
look into how he accomplished his trick does this mark a limit for awe as the 
beginning of ethnomethodological inquiry (Blum and McHugh 1984)? Blaine intends 
that his audience ‘appreciate the sky or smell the air. Those moments are special to 
me…’ (p3) His show offers us something so extra-ordinary that we will be woken to 
the wonder of the world. His dilemma is that his method for doing this inevitably 
arouses our curiosity too. And later in the same interview with Beatrice Colin, Blaine 
adds: 
 
“I like when people watch,” he says. “I like the attention. I like to provoke 
thought, any thought. And I’d like it if everyone walked away with the belief 
that everyone can do whatever they want.” 
 
It is key to what Houdini and Blaine do that they ask us to ‘pay attention’ and that we 
do pay attention, since if we’re not paying attention then we are poor witnesses to 
what they are showing us. It would be too easy to fool someone who was distracted, 
though of course paying attention is just the distraction from our everyday troubles 
that Houdini and Blaine are also looking for. And yet Blaine wants, not that the world 
should be filled up with death defying stunts and impossible feats of survival or 
escape artists like himself or Houdini, but that everyone should appreciate afterwards 
what is there to be had by anyone (be it the evening sky or the aroma of coffee). Can 
we say that his is a plea to see something for what it is right now and not be thinking 
of something else? Is it the teacher’s ambition that their class be riveted during their 
lesson? But Blaine when he performs is not giving a lesson on how he is offering a 
breach which might induce us to think things are not what they seem afterwards. 
Unlike the teacher he does not want to deliver ‘thought’ as if it were an object, as if it 
were ‘stuff’, a statistic or a proof to be carried away. He hopes that thinking might 
                                                 
8 Houdini’s patented but never built trick was to be imprisoned in a large block of ice and then appear 
several minutes later on stage outside the block leaving the ice seemingly unmarked by his escape. 
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start in the space after they have witnessed what he is doing. There is no guarantee 
that the audience will realise their freedom having watched Blaine’s astounding show 
of human capability, it is something that he hopes for, as he hopes that they will have 
a thought. Not about him. Not about taking up magic. Not  ‘let’s explain magic’, not 
for his audience to walk away and reduce its amazingness to mere technologies and a 
deception for the purposes of enlisting them into believing in the supernatural (always 
Houdini’s worry). While Blaine is willing to bring an audience to a state of 
amazement through his spectacle, he is left with nothing to teach apart from how his 
magic is done, and that is not what he want to teach an audience, it is in what he 
would train only candidate magicians. 
 
Houdini would arm himself to amaze even the ‘fault-finder’ in the audience (Phillips 
2001), the person who could say ‘oh it’s obvious how this trick is done.’ Houdini was 
seeking to show even the most sceptical person in the room wonder. He wanted to 
convert sceptics, they were the acid test. And yet he wished still for them to exercise 
their critical faculties and hence his huge disappointment when his friend Conan 
Doyle was ‘bewitched’ by the methods of Spiritualists (Phillips 2001).  The surprise 
surely is not in Doyle’s wonder over magic but in his failure to grasp its technical 
details; since he is the creator of the detail-obsessed, uber-observer, Sherlock Holmes. 
 
Ethnomethodology is misunderstood, even by some of its practitioners, as only being 
about the details, mechanics, the devices and technologies whereby, say, ‘doing being 
ordinary’ is accomplished. This however is only half the story, just as for a magician 
recognition of the techniques is only half of doing magic, the constituent parts without 
the whole.  
 
It is ethnomethodological about EM studies that they show for ordinary 
society’s substantive events, in material contents, just and only in any actual 
case, that and just how vulgarly competent members concert their activities to 
produce and show, exhibit and make observably the case*, demonstrate, and so 
on, coherence cogency, analysis, detail, structure, consistency, order, meaning, 
mistakes, errors, coincidence, facticity, reason, methods – locally, reflexively, 
naturally accountable phenomena- and as of the haecceities of their ordinary 
lives together. 
  We learn from the corpus of EM studies that its radical studies have begun to 
reveal immortal ordinary society as a wondrous thing [my emphasis]. Its 
members, be they “lay analysts” or professionals in the worldwide social 
science movement, with straightforward normal thoughtfulness are able to read 
it out of relevance, eyeless in Gaza, p202 (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992) 
 
Garfinkel even as he pushes toward the myriad practices whereby phenomena are 
constituted wants us to waken to the wonder of each phenomenon, as Wittgenstein 
wishes us to do the same (Bearn 1997).  There is an orderly world all around us, we 
make it happen and it is wonderful that it happens. The difference in examining, 
describing and analysing the unspectacular is that ethnomethodology (at least in 
places) offers back to us how anyone, every competent person makes the sense of this 
situation, showing members to be like Houdinis in that they have tricks to produce 
recognisable social objects. Houdini’s spectacle contains itself, we are not all about to 
become escape artists, there should be only one amazing Houdini, one mysterious 
David Blaine! Always threatening to become hybridised out of existence with the 
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fields of practical action in which it situates it studies (Lynch 1993) traditional 
ethnomethodology begins from the principle that we are all using ethnomethods9 and 
yet it seems not urge that we all become ethnomethodologist – or not any more than 
we already are. The question that Blaine’s word raise is whether by becoming 
ethnomethodologists we will eventually lose our sense of wonder.  Will we miss the 
spectacle by pursuing the tricks and lived work by which it is made. 
 
 
4. 
 
Ethnomethodology finds itself at home in work contexts helping with the redesign of 
user interfaces (Crabtree, Nichols, O'Brien, Rouncefield, and Twidale 2000), help 
systems (Suchman 1987), airports (Harper and Hughes 1993) and factories 
(Kawatoko 1999). Houdini assists the police in redesigning handcuffs, first world war 
soldiers on escaping from enemy and even uses his experience of underwater escapes 
to design a mechanism to release divers quickly from their suits. This is not part of the 
magic but it’s a useful spin off of the concern with practical matters. Houdini’s 
‘Handcuff Secrets’ sold out within days as it was bought by would be and actual 
criminals across the USA and its illustrations were banned in Germany (Phillips 
2001). In his ‘The Right Way to Wrong’ Houdini writes: 
 
The mob is a gang of expert pickpockets under the direction of a leader who has 
had experience and knows all the tricks. Their usual game is to frequent some 
crowded platform or a railway station and raise a row in which two men seem to 
engage in a scuffle or a quarrel and come to blows. Others rush in attempting to 
separate them, and the attention of the whole crowd of people is for the moment 
directed strongly that way. At the same moment, other single light fingered 
members of the same gang crowd in with the citizens who are being jostled and 
abstract their pocketbooks and watches without any trouble. (Houdini 1953) 
p275. 
 
Like Goffman and like so many ethnomethodologists he is interested in criminal 
techniques – lock-picking, forgery, hidden messages, stealing from moving vehicles, 
pickpockets, con-artists and burglars (i.e. the chewing gum trick on p277 (Houdini 
1953)). The pick-pocket, the con-artist and conjuror seek to hide what they are really 
up to. They do not seek to avoid being seen at all, they are attempting to evade 
detection of what they are really up to. What pick-pockets display of their actions to 
us are the appearances of something else : the guy clumsily bumping into you on the 
pavement, not the painstakingly crafted move that does a deliberate collision in a way 
that looks accidental whilst dipping a hand so lightly into your inside pocket you do 
not feel it or see it. Olympian acting skills are at work since they must not be seen as 
‘acting’ in order that we see only a possibly incompetent pedestrian.  We do not even 
say, until we have to report the incident to the police and other interested parties such 
                                                 
9 There is a periodisation to ethnomethodology between its early ‘traditional’ studies (Boden 1994; 
Garfinkel 1967) and the later more radical studies of astronomy (Garfinkel, Lynch, and Livingstone 
1981), law (Lynch and McNally 1999) and mathematics, wherein the latter push away from any 
member’s competence, to the situated practices of expert fields. In the later studies they are no longer 
collapsing the extra-ordinary down on to the ordinary, they are radicalising phenomenal intactness in 
that they are asking just what is it that makes a scientific discovery or scientific evidence in a court of 
law. 
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as our friends and colleagues, ‘he appeared just to be another guy walking along the 
street’. Until we discover the absence of our wallet he was just another guy walking 
along the street. 
 
There is a familiar worry about whether wonder is a function of ignorance, so 
that the more knowledge we acquire the less room there is for wonder. But on 
my account, wonder is not under threat from knowledge, it is under threat from 
a certain way of looking at things [Anschauungswiese], a pun deaf way of 
looking at things. The enemy here is the voice of common sense, the defender 
of the obvious [Selbstverständlichkeit]. The enemy of wonder is a certain 
attitude to our epistemic practices, and wonder is made possible by a change in 
our attitude to those practices rather than by any failure of those epistemic 
practices on their own terms. (Bearn 1997 p196) 
 
Houdini allows the possibility that we can be fooled, and that under certain 
circumstances we want to be fooled, though not by the state, not by the thief, not by 
our building society, not by our newspaper10. We want to be fooled when we are 
ready to be fooled, when we are expecting to be fooled and when everyone of us will 
be fooled at the same time11. Seeing the trick, like getting a dirty joke (Sacks 1978), is 
a non-trivial exercise since let us imagine for a moment a person lacking the capacity 
to see that they have been fooled (before we even consider understanding how you 
have been fooled). For instance we cannot do card tricks to amuse our cat, nor amaze 
it by escaping out of a locked trunk. Seeing a trick is already then a shared human 
accomplishment12. 
 
Where a member of an audience joins with ethnomethodology’s ethos is in awakening 
in them a sharpened curiosity to know how the magician does what he does. At one of 
Houdini’s or Blaine’s shows the audience might fully examine their own sense-
making procedures to consider how they have be fooled, more likely they will accept 
the possibility and enjoy the show without needing to get to the bottom of the trick’s 
lived work.  We should be careful here as to how far we wish to equate 
ethnomethodology’s awe at ‘commonplace action’ (p87 Blum and McHugh) with the 
tricks of magicians. It is the ethnomethodologist who has a similar sense of awe at 
commonplace actions as an audience has for Houdini or Blaine’s spectacular feats. 
And it is the ethnomethodologist who departs from the logic of an audience when 
they pursue the clarification of the particular devices which produced the magic. If, 
and when, ethnomethodologists pursue the misdirections of magicians or equally of 
‘sincere liars’ (Lynch 1996), while they are awed by them they might no longer be 
affirming convention. 
 
Moving away, from doing being an audience, to doing a magical trick we will run up 
against the training required and the effort involved to present what the audience 
should see and hide what they should not. There are times, where even with the best 
instructions, as a trainee magician still cannot grasp how a certain trick works. Is this 
                                                 
10 There are exceptional occasions when we will allow this – April 1st being the most obvious example. 
11 As also in Goffman’s (1974) later attempt to reformulate what he had come to see as a fundamental 
problem with his dramaturgical reductions in ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’. He realised 
that acting on stage involves special permissions from both actors and audience  and is made sense of 
by its sense as theatre not as part of the flow of a pavement or talk around a family breakfast table. 
12 There are parallels here to Sack’s (1992 vol.2) consideration of the dirty joke as a technical object. 
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so different from the frustration we feel on not being able to follow a proof in 
mathematics? Our competence as ordinary actors relies on us being able to be see a 
trick and the expert skill of the magician is to be able to (re)produce a trick in a way 
that hides what should be hidden and shows what should be shown. In this way a 
magician is unlike a mathematician or a scientist. Hybridising ethnomethodology with 
escape artistry produces members with an interest in how background expectations 
can be purposefully manipulated to make a thing appear (when that thing may not be 
there), at such a point do we run up against the limit of members since they should be 
disinterested in how they produce appearances? 
 
 
 
Houdini does to members of an audience what phenomenologists do as part of their 
investigations of human experience of the world – he makes them suspend judgement 
on the objects and events under scrutiny. We should no longer assume that the brick 
wall is what normally think of as a brick wall, we should no longer assume that the 
straitjacket is what we think a straitjacket is. When we look at his show we will have 
to examine how our experience of brick walls or straitjackets constitutes their 
impassibility, restriction, their appearance. Moreover he plays upon our secondary 
methods for checking on the appearance of a brick wall or straitjacket being 
suspicious. He has members of the audience come and tap the brick wall, he has 
asylum orderlies verify that his straitjacket is securely fastened. As members of the 
audience we are perplexed to see these investigations at work since we know they will 
only verify what Houdini wants verified and what does this say of power of 
experience to see things as they really are? And yet do the audience all suddenly 
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become convinced that reality is inaccessible, that they should either become sceptical 
philosophers or social constructionists? 
 
Even having been shown how ‘a woman being sawn in half in a box’ works we can sit 
back and watch the show again and see the magical aspect to it. To watch and to 
produce magic tricks we, as a competent audience, have to be able to see aspects (not 
unlike the duck-rabbit diagram or the faces/candle-stick picture (Wittgenstein 1953)). 
For the amazing magic trick the other aspect to the trick remains hidden though we 
know it surely exists, while for the well known one, or the one we are taught, we can 
see both aspects – that it works and how it works13. Things take a strange turn at this 
point in that does this lead us into equating ordinary members with magicians: they 
know how to do a trick and they can recognise the illusion that a trick produces. Once 
again we have make a distinction between the illusion which is the object of magic 
and say a turn at talk which is the object of conversation. If ethnomethodologists are 
the ones who are amazed by ordinary life then they are in some senses its audience. 
 
In a reversal of the skeleton keys, rejigged coffins, secret drawers, and altered 
shuffles of magic, Garfinkel had a 
box of special equipment that he 
used in the teaching of 
ethnomethodology. To make  
intelligibility anthropologically 
strange, students were given prism 
glasses that flipped their vision 
upside down which Garfinkel asked 
them to wear while fetching a cup 
of water from a tap or being shown 
a spot to sit on a wall by another 
student. Directions in these 
instances became impossible to 
follow by normal means. Chess 
games were also made deeply 
problematic by donning the inverting lenses. It made apprehensible the embodied 
rather than ‘mental’ aspects of playing a game with rules.  Students were dazed, 
bemused and quite often amazed during these sessions. Students were also given 
headphones and a microphone with a delay loop that made their wearer hear their 
voice a second or so after they spoke.  It made apprehensible that without noticing it 
you are listening to what you say as you say it, and with your hearing-what-is-being-
said disrupted speaking at any length quickly becomes problematic. The equipment 
showed the potentially bewildering equipmentality of human practice – we do not 
think of seeing as something we have to learn with eyes as equipment. Much like the 
breaching experiments mentioned earlier, Garfinkel is pushing in a different practical 
way against a theoretical account of how we make things intelligible. 
 
Think of these as jobs of bodies – not anatomists’ bodies, or biologists’ bodies, 
but work’s bodies. The bodies of practices. These bodies have eyes that are 
skills; eyes that are skills in the ways that eyes do looking’s work. Where seeing 
is something more, other and different than formally analytically describable 
                                                 
13 Or are the incommensurate ways of seeing – to look in one way excludes looking in the other? 
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positionining the orbs to assure certain retinal registration of a perceptual field, 
let alone a visiual field, p210 (Garfinkel 2002) 
 
 
 
 
Beckoning experts and members of the audience Houdini says ‘to the things 
themselves!’ and you know it’s a mistake to try and inspect the rope and chair he is 
showing you, his showing is a misdirection. He is showing you that he can show you 
‘this is a brick wall’ and confuse you with your own natural and ordinary sense of 
what a brick wall allows you do with it. He is showing that [showing an object] can 
be a diversion and that what is obviously, say, a rope restraint blinds us. Garfinkel 
with his inverting lenses brings us squarely up against what has become ‘embodiedly 
transparent’ in following honest non-deceptive everyday directions in their details of 
looking with eyes, positioning fingers and the orientational properties of furniture. We 
have to be careful not to overburden ‘showing’, where clearly there are divergent uses 
of this term. Garfinkel [showing a person somewhere to sit] and Houdini showing 
(misdirecting) an audience (with) a coffin. 
 
Houdini’s refusal to reveal his current trick did not mean that there really was 
something inaccessible that he could not share, that there was a spirit hidden beneath 
the surface of things, that we could not learn how his trick was done. Houdini is clear 
that you will not find out how Houdini’s current amazing trick works 14, since yes he 
does give away tricks once they are old to the annoyance of other magicians, and, yes, 
he shares with his wife, and teaches his assistants how his tricks work so that they can 
help him. Often he’ll need assistants to quickly adapt barrels, caskets or canvas bags 
for ‘on the spot’ challenges. So Houdini can show his assistants what to do to make 
the ‘show’ work. 
  
Houdini and Blaine are offering us magic without hidden forces beyond their tricks, 
their human accomplishments. Magic is of great value to them and they guard against 
uses they see as immoral and misleading. In the later years of Houdini’s life he 
pursues spiritualists with missionary zeal (Houdini 1953; Phillips 2001; Silverman 
1996). In his exposure of séances Houdini in fact shows that with the unmatched 
practical and historical expertise that he has in tricks, sleight of hand and conjuring, 
the devices used by mediums can easily be revealed. Whilst this kills their claims to 
the supernatural, it leaves his grounds for the wonder of magic untouched. However 
it’s  clear from Houdini, the investigator untrained in magical tricks and sleight of 
hand, even if they are eminent professor of psychology will continue to mistake what 
is going on.  
 
‘Men like Professor McDougall [a psychology professor at Harvard who 
questioned Houdini’s worth as an investigator of Spiritualists (EL’s 
addition)]… and Conan Doyle are menaces to mankind,’ he replied in kind to an 
interviewer, ‘because laymen believe them to be as intellectual in all fields as 
they are in their own particular one.’ They too, like the Spiritualists, gain 
                                                 
14 As we have noted already even on being shown how it works you may still not adequately grasp how 
it works, you sort of follow what is going on. Like you sort of follow when a software programmer 
tells you in detail how they wrote a piece of code that compresses a video image. 
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people’s confidence to hoodwink them; there is a new clergy of respectable 
experts, and everyone else is a layman, p134 (Phillips 2001) 
 
Houdini makes this still more blatant since he has used police officers, doctors and all 
manner of expert witnesses to try and spot his tricks and they have failed to detect 
how he did what he did. Spiritualists, he makes clear, have it easy by comparison with 
Houdini – they dim the lights, they sit with their legs hidden under the table. For their 
normal clients in fact would be improper to pursue scepticism over their acts and start 
trying pulling up the carpet to look for hidden wires. And even if they did something 
so confrontational, without Houdini’s grasp of the practical arts of deception, they 
will not see how they were deceived and thus that deception at all happened. 
 
Phillips, p46: Above all, he shows us, the audience wants to know that it can’t 
see: wants to thrill to its own ignorance. 
 
But wait, is it thrilling to ignorance or is as Blaine’s quote suggested that we are 
thrilling to a pre-critical, pre-interpretive appreciation of the world, a world where 
amazing things can happen and we don’t know why? In this case to ‘get’ Houdini or 
Blaine, as an adequate audience we should not try and interrogate his act, though by 
Houdini’s arguments we ought to let an expert check on their competitors (e.g. the 
Spiritualists) with more transcendental and supernatural claims. 
 
Let us note only quickly in passing that ethnomethodologists have long pursued 
sociology and psychology for their improper uses of the resources which possession 
of ordinary language and a place in a shared world gives them (Coulter 1979; 
McHugh, Raffel, Foss, and Blum 1974; Watson 1992). They criticise sociology and 
psychology for their appropriation of lay knowledge as their domain and one that they 
can judge for its lack or presence of reason, morality or immorality (Bogen 1989; 
Bogen 1999; Lynch 1999). 
 
 
5. 
 
What does it mean that Blaine says that if we obsess upon learning how such a trick 
works then we do not get what he is trying to do? Houdini is likewise not attempting 
to get everyone to be trained magicians, to instruct them into how to be magicians too, 
to find the explanation for each amazing escape. Houdini is not posing the question 
for us of why would he want to be free of his restraint? Why would he try to get out 
of a packing case dropped off a pier? These are obvious matters surely?   
 
There is no such as magic, Houdini is saying, but I am a magician capable of 
inexplicable feats; there is nothing concealed, you can see everything, but you 
still don’t know, p45 (Phillips 2001) 
 
Why are Blaine and Houdini so concerned that their magic, their escape artistry 
should be looked at in a certain way and not another. It is not that they think magic 
skills should not be passed on to another generation of magicians, this they most 
certainly do. They are concerned with the lineage of tricks, stunts, devices and 
techniques and they are happy to write basic guides to get non-initiates started. That 
those who are its audience ought to look-on in a certain ‘natural’ way is because the 
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spectacle is not fashioned to show something to those who make it while they make it, 
in fact they cannot take of it, they give it to the audience. It is the audience that looks 
in wonder not the magician or escape artist. Houdini is an expert at ‘look how 
amazing this is’; a member of the audience could not turn away having seen him 
escape from a strait jacket dangling from a towerblock and say ‘how obvious’.  
 
Let us imagine a theatre; the curtain goes up and we see a man alone in a room, 
walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, sitting down etc. so that suddenly we 
are observing a human being from the outside in a way that ordinarily we can 
never observe ourselves; it would be like watching a chapter of biography with 
your own eyes, -- surely this would be uncanny and wonderful at the same time. 
We should be observing something more wonderful than anything a playwright 
could arrange to be acted or spoken on the stage: life itself. –But then we do this 
every day without it making the slightest impression on us! True enough, but 
we do not see it from that point of view. (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p4, 
quoted in Bearn (1997 p197)) 
 
In the ethnomethodological attitude, ‘this is obvious’ will not be allowed and in its 
attention to ‘life itself’ ethnomethodology is not just a demonstration, not just an 
exhibit, not just instruction in how to do a Pythagorean proof (Livingston 1986), play 
jazz piano (Sudnow 1978) or select a next speaker in conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, 
and Jefferson 1978). Sacks warns of the dangers of looking at someone as a priori 
amazing as Houdini, yet his purposes are shared in that by the end we should see 
something amazing happening in our world. Where an audience needs the spectacular 
to show this, Sacks from ‘that point of view’ finds amazement ‘at hand’ : finding 
order at all points, discovering how finely detailed the organisation of every 
interaction is and how quickly talking in turns works.  Where Sacks and Garfinkel 
exceed being merely an audience is that their wonder returns from finding out how 
the trick is done to what the trick is for theory. It is this voyage back to what we know 
already that they call respecifying. 
 
The ethnomethodologist is only technically different, so how could he be 
principled about this difference? In a way, she does not know what is correct 
any more than the member, any more than convention knows; convention can 
know itself, but when itself is correct, it is enforceably intelligible, and such 
concerted meaning is indifferent to good. Boldly put, the enforceably 
intelligible nature of convention limits it to power and clarity. In fact, we have 
seen that making convention problematic is only to give voice to convention as 
a way of saying how convention is, not what it is. Convention is shown to be 
trusted in and through the times and places where convention is made 
problematic. Ethnomethodology’s aim is to speak for the ordinary, which is 
ordinarily speechless, through the trouble that finally gains the attention of the 
ordinary … ethnomethodology puts convention into question not to question 
convention but to affirm it, as a member would and does… p88-89 (Blum and 
McHugh 1984) 
 
We do not all want to be escape artists, magicians nor do we all want to be 
ethnomethodologists, yet they do promise us, at the very least, a show of something 
quite amazing.  We would want to become magicians to make an audience enter a 
state of wonder at what they are watching. Some part of a magician’s show is also an 
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invite for some of the audience to take on the arduous, dull and technical training that 
will be required to further learn how magic is made with the skilful handling of card 
plants, stage screws and loose fitting shoes. With patience, a willingness to repeat 
actions to see how they work and an eye for the details from time to time a world of 
wonders is conjured. Might in ethnomethodology’s ultimate affirmation of ordinary 
practices, their clarification of conceptual matters, a world of wonders start to be worn 
away? Do they become an impoverished audience or an audience with an alternate 
way of looking at things and in that sense no longer an ordinary audience? 
 
Coulter (2001) and Lynch (2001) emphasize that ethnomethodology can offer 
therapeutics to the maladies of foundational enterprises in social theory in the same 
way that Wittgenstein’s investigations help cure explanatory philosophy’s peculiar 
problems. An ethnomethodologist might be someone who stages (shows in this sense) 
ordinary language, or the situatedness of all inquiries, for an audience of theorists to 
get that audience back on firm ground. The dangling Houdini never made us more 
sure of the ground upon which we stand as we look up at him and feel that he might 
fall.  And yet it is in the essence of what Houdini is that an audience should not know 
how the trick works. Competent magicians can teach their tricks to anyone, and they 
are using anyone’s tricks but Houdini or Blaine would be ruined, would disappoint us 
if they gave away what we are amazed by. The spectacular showing cannot be 
reduced to an ordinary showing lest we lose our sense of wonder. 
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